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Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a Per Capita Basis?

Abstract
Many people believe that the problem of climate change would be best handled by
an international agreement that includes a system of “cap and trade.” Such a system
would impose a global cap on greenhouse gases emissions and allocate tradable
emissions permits. This proposal raises a crucial but insufficiently explored question:
How should such permits be allocated? It is tempting to suggest that in principle,
allocation should be done on a per capita basis, with the idea that each person should
begin with the same entitlement, regardless of place of birth. This idea, pressed by many
analysts and by the developing world, can be defended on grounds of either welfare or
fairness. But on both grounds, per capita allocations run into serious objections. If
fairness is understood in terms of equally or proportionally sharing the burdens of a
climate treaty, per capita allocations are not fair because they do not take into account
all the effects of such a treaty. Any agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will
give more benefits to some nations than to others, and will impose more costs on some
nations than on others; in these circumstances, per capita emissions rights give the
appearance but not the reality of fairness. For those who seek redistribution to those who
need help, on grounds of either welfare or fairness, per capita allocations of emissions
rights are at best a mixed blessing. Some rich nations are highly populated, and some
poor nations have small populations; there is essentially no relationship between size of
population and per capita wealth. Per capita allocations would also create serious
incentive problems, and they would face decisive objections from the standpoint of
feasibility: Per capita rights would transfer hundreds of billions of dollars annually from
the United States to China and India, and the United States is most unlikely to sign a
treaty with that consequence. Comparisons are drawn between per capita allocations and
other approaches, including those based on existing emissions rates and those with selfconscious redistributive aims. A general goal is to balance welfarist and fairness goals
with feasibility constraints; per capita allocations do a poor job of achieving that
balance, and an insistence on that approach might make the climate change problem
intractable. These conclusions have general implications for thinking about normative
goals and practical limitations in the context of international law.

3

I. Introduction
Many people believe that the problem of climate change should be handled by
some kind of international cap-and-trade system.1 Under this approach, participating
nations, and perhaps the entire world, would create a “cap” on greenhouse gas emissions.
Nations would be allocated specified emissions rights, which could be traded in return for
cash. A system of this kind might well be the most effective and efficient method of
reducing emissions; it may also be the wave of the future.2
By itself, however, the proposal for a cap-and-trade system does not answer a
crucial question: How should emissions rights be allocated? It is tempting to suggest that
the status quo, across nations, provides the appropriate baseline. On one view, emissions
might be frozen at existing levels, so that every nation has the right to its current level of
emissions. On a more aggressive view, generally captured in the Kyoto Protocol,3 all or
most signatory nations should have to reduce their emissions levels by a specified
percentage, again taking the status quo as the foundation for reductions. The status quo
might seem to have intuitive appeal, but it is also somewhat arbitrary and raises serious
questions from the standpoint of equity.4 Why should climate change policy take existing
national emissions, and to that extent existing national energy uses, as a given for policy
purposes? Should a nation with 300 million people be given the same emissions rights as
a nation with one billion people, or 40 million people, simply because the emissions of
the three nations, at the current time, are roughly equal?
Raising these questions, many observers have strenuously urged that in an
international agreement, emissions rights should be allocated by reference to population,
not to existing emissions.5 The intuition here is that every person on the planet should
1

See, e.g., Richard Stewart and Jonathan Wiener, Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto (2003)
See id.
3
This is an oversimplification. See Cass R. Sunstein, Worst-Case Scenarios 87-90 (2007), for
qualifications.
4
William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Warming the World 149-168 (2001).
5
See, e.g., National Development and Reform Commission, People’s Republic of China, China’s National
Climate Change Programme 58 (June 2007); Daniel Bodansky, International Climate Efforts Beyond 2012:
A Survey of Approaches (2004) (describing several per capita approaches); Anil Agarwal, Making the
Kyoto Protocol Work: Ecological and Economic Efectiveness, and Equity in the climate regime, available
at http://www.cseindia.org/html/eyou/climate/pdf/cse_stat.pdf; Anil Agarwal and S. Narain, Global
Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental Colonialism (1991); Tom Athanasiou and Paul
Baer, Dead Heat: Global Justice and Global Warming (2002); Ann Kizig and Daniel Kammen, National
Trajectories of Carbon Emissions; Analysis of Proposals to Foster the Transition to Low-Carbon
Economies, 8 Global Environmental Change 183 (1998); Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera and Michael
Finus, Permit Trading and Stability of International Climate Agreements, 9 J Applied Economics 19
(2006); A. D. Sagar, Wealth, Responsibility, and Equity: Exploring an Allocation Framework for Global
GHG Emissions, 45 Climatic Change 511 (2000); Peter Singer, One World 35 (2002); Juliane Kokott,
Equity in International Law, in Fair Weather?: Equity Concerns in Climate Change 173, 188 (Ferenc L.
Tóth ed. 1999); Hermann E. Ott and Wolfgang Sachs, The Ethics of International Emissions Trading, in
Ethics, Equity, and International Negotiations on Climate Change 159-68 (Luiz Pinguelli-Rosa and Mohan
Munasinghe eds. 2002) (“The equal right of all world citizens to the atmospheric commons is therefore the
cornerstone of any viable climate regime.”); Malik Amin Aslam, Equal Per Capita Entitlements: A Key To
2
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begin with the same emissions right; it should not matter whether people find themselves
in a nation whose existing emissions rates are high. Those concerned about the welfare of
developing nations are especially interested in per capita allocations of emissions rights.6
Why should a poor nation, with a large population, be required to stick close to its current
emissions level, when wealthy nations with identical populations are permitted to emit far
more? Why should existing distributions of wealth, insofar as they are reflected in current
emissions, be taken as the foundation for climate change policy? More bluntly: Why
should the United States be given emissions rights that dwarf those of China and India,
which have much larger populations?
This argument might well be connected with a general “right to development.”7 If
the status quo is the baseline for allocating emissions rights, poor nations are likely to
have great difficulty in achieving the levels of development already attained by wealthy
nations. Perhaps an imaginable climate change agreement, one that would be based on
existing national rates, would violate the “right to development” even if it would be both
effective and efficient.
The significance of this controversy can hardly be exaggerated. The United
States, long an obstacle to a climate treaty, finally committed itself at the 2007 climate
conference at Bali to negotiate a treaty with binding greenhouse-gas mitigation
obligations.8 Any eventual treaty will almost certainly include a cap-and-trade system, as
there is under the Kyoto Protocol9—one has been put in place in the European Union, and
another is contained in bills currently before Congress.10 Most notably, the per capita
approach has been described as “the most politically prominent contender for any specific
global formula for long-term allocations with increasing numbers of adherents in both
developed and developing countries,”11 including India, China, and as many as 130 other
countries, and the European Union.12 However, the United States has obliquely indicated
discomfort with the per capita system, arguing that developing countries that are, or will
Global Participation on Climate Change?, in Building on the Kyoto Protocol: Options for Protecting the
Climate 127 (Kevin A. Baumert ed. 2002); Donald Brown, American Heat: Ethical Problems with the
United States’ Response to Global Warming 214 (2002); Sven Bode, Equal Emissions per Capita over
Time—A Proposal to Combine Responsibility and Equity of Rights (2003), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=477281. See also J. Timmons Roberts and Bradley C.
Parks, A Climate of Injustice: Global Inequality, North-South Politics, and Climate Policy 144-46 (2007)
(describing international support for the per capita approach); Jeffrey Frankel, Formulas for Quantitative
Emissions Targets, in Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto
World 31, 40 (Joseph E. Aldy and Robert N. Stavins eds. 2007) (noting developing world demand for per
capita system).
6
See, e.g., National Development and Reform Commission, supra note; Frankel, supra note; Kivig and
Kammen, supra note; Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus, supra note.
7
See United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, Res. 41/28 (1986).
8
See Bali Action Plan ¶1 (2007), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/
application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf.
9
For good outlines, see Richard B. Stewart and Jonathan Wiener, Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond
Kyoto (2003); Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note, at 145-68.
10
See John M. Broder, Senate Panel Passes Bill to Limit Greenhouse Gases
N.Y. Times, December 6, 2007, at A39.
11
See Grubb et al., supra at 270.
12
Roberts and Parks, supra at 144.
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soon be, industrial powers—including China, India, and Brazil—will have to accept
significant mitigation obligations in a climate treaty.13 It is unlikely, we will argue, that a
per capita system will satisfy the demands of the United States, one of the world’s
leading greenhouse gas emitters on a per capita basis. Meanwhile, the per capita
approach remains the reigning political and ethical paradigm for the distribution of
permits because it has been largely unquestioned.
Our goal in this Article is to identify the problems with the per capita system, in
terms of both principle and feasibility, and to suggest that its current prominence and
popularity are undeserved. We suggest that advocates of per capita allocations are correct
on one point: In principle, there is little to be said for basing emissions rights on existing
emissions levels. The most plausible defense of this approach is pragmatic. Nations are
unlikely to sign an international agreement if they will be significant net losers,14 and
wealthy nations might lose a great deal from any approach that does not use existing
emissions as the baseline for reductions. But this pragmatic point shows only that
powerful nations might well veto approaches that are better in principle; it does not show
that those nations are correct to do so. As a normative matter, an approach based on per
capita emissions rights seems preferable to one based on existing emissions, and there are
strong intuitive claims, rooted in welfarist and other arguments, on behalf of such an
approach. One of our principal purposes is to cast those claims in a sympathetic light.
As we shall also see, however, a per capita approach also runs into powerful
objections. We demonstrate this point by comparing that approach to several others,
above all those based on existing emissions and those with explicitly redistributive aims.
Most fundamentally, per capita allocations will help some rich nations and hurt some
poor ones. The reason is that some rich nations are highly populated, and some poor
nations are not. In fact there is no correlation between population size and wealth per
capita. If global redistribution or international justice is the goal, the per capita approach
is a highly imperfect means. From the standpoint of those who favor assistance to poor
people in poor nations, per capita emissions allocations are far less attractive than they
seem. In some cases, the per capita approach turns out to be perverse. From the
standpoint of global redistribution – justified on grounds of either welfare or fairness –
other approaches, more directly focused on the central goals, would be much better. A
key point here, insufficiently appreciated in the current debate, is that any emissions
reduction agreement will impose a disparate array of costs and benefits, varying greatly
across nations; in these circumstances, a per capita approach turns out to have far less
appeal on reflection than on first glance.
Many people support the per capita approach not on redistributive grounds, but on
the basis of a simple and plausible appeal to fairness.15 The atmosphere’s carbonabsorbing features are naturally thought of as a common resource. Perhaps a common
13

See The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary (December 15, 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/12/20071215-1.html.
14
See Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (2006).
15
See, e.g., Michael Grubb et al., Sharing the Burden, in Confronting Climate Change: Risks, Implications
and Responses 318-19 (Irving M. Mintzer ed. 1992) (and citations therein).
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resource should be divided among all the people in the world on the ground that all
people enjoy a right to equal opportunity or to equal human dignity.16 Indeed, the same
type of argument has been made about mineral resources discovered under the high seas:
as no particular state “owns” these resources, they should be divided on a per capita
basis.17 And given the constraints of national sovereignty, the resources should be given
to national governments on the basis of their states’ share of the global population rather
than divided up among individuals directly.
We will show that the analogy to common property is at best incomplete and
obscures the relevant moral concerns. If we compare a climate treaty and a treaty that
provides for the exploitation of an underwater mineral deposit, we immediately see that
there is a crucial difference between the two settings. A climate treaty, by reducing
global warming, will have differential benefits and costs for people around the world.
While some people will benefit a great deal, others will benefit much less and perhaps
not at all. By contrast, exploitation of mineral deposits has minimal differential effects.
Per capita distribution of greenhouse gas emission permits would distribute the revenues
from the abatement program on an equal basis, but would not equalize the overall effects
of that program.
In principle, the appropriate way to distribute permits is on the basis of the
aggregate effects of the climate treaty in light of standard normative theories –
emphasizing, for example, distributive justice, welfare, or fairness. From the standpoint
of those theories, and in particular on welfarist grounds, the per capita approach does
have major advantages over an approach based on existing emissions, because it would
provide significantly greater benefits to poor people. But the per capita approach would
also have some unfortunate incentive effects, which complicate the inquiry. Even if those
effects are put to one side, a per capita approach is far inferior to an approach that focuses
more concretely on what the right normative theory requires.
We shall also explore a series of pragmatic problems with the per capita approach,
including its incentive effects with respect to future international agreements and
population growth. A pervasive question involves feasibility. The problem of climate
change cannot be successfully addressed without an international agreement that includes
all or almost all of the major contributors. Per capita allocations would have the effect of
redistributing hundreds of billions of dollars from wealthy nations, above all the United
States, to developing nations, above all China and India. For this reason, insistence on per
capita allocations would effectively doom any climate change agreement. We offer some
brief remarks about the relationship between this pragmatic constraint and some of the
underlying questions of principle.
Our conclusions are that on welfarist grounds, the per capita approach is at most a
crude second-best, and that it faces decisive objections from the standpoint of feasibility.
16

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 1.
The Law of the Sea Convention provides that such resources be divided “equitably”; however, that term
has multiple meanings and is left undefined. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art.
140.

17
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Insistence on that approach would effectively doom an international effort to reduce the
risks associated with climate change. And while our focus throughout is on the problem
of climate change, the analysis will have general implications for issues of international
law, where treaty development frequently raises questions about the relationships among
welfare, fairness, and feasibility.18
I. Aggregate Emissions vs. Per Capita Emissions
An international agreement might allocate emissions rights in many different
ways. If existing national emissions rates are the guide, the ranking across nations would
look like this:19
Table 1: GHG Emissions—Total CO2 Emissions in 2004
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Country
United States
China
European Union (25)
Russian Federation
Japan
India
Germany
United Kingdom
Canada
Korea (South)
Italy
South Africa
Mexico
Iran
France
Indonesia
Spain
Australia
Brazil
Saudi Arabia
Ukraine
Poland
Taiwan
Thailand
Turkey
Netherlands
Kazakhstan
Egypt
Malaysia

Millions of Metric
Tons CO2
5,888.7
5,204.8
4,017.1
1,575.3
1,304.2
1,199.0
856.6
551.3
549.1
507.0
482.2
427.9
415.3
407.6
396.7
368.0
355.1
350.9
346.2
342.9
329.6
304.0
276.6
238.5
229.2
187.1
178.4
152.2
149.2

18

An especially helpful discussion is Scott Barrett, Environment and Statecraft 335-358 (2003).
Tables generated by World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool, online at
http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=yearly. Excludes land use change.

19
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30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Argentina
Venezuela
Uzbekistan
Czech Republic
Pakistan
Belgium
United Arab Emirates
Greece
Romania
Vietnam
Algeria
Nigeria
Iraq
Philippines
Austria
Korea (North)
Finland
Kuwait
Belarus
Portugal
Israel
Chile
Colombia
Hungary
Serbia & Montenegro
Sweden
Denmark
Syria
Singapore
Libya
Bulgaria
Switzerland
Ireland
Norway
Slovakia
Turkmenistan
Qatar
Morocco
Bangladesh
New Zealand
Oman
Azerbaijan
Peru
Ecuador
Cuba
Tunisia

145.6
140.2
131.9
125.2
125.2
119.2
104.0
98.8
96.1
91.8
91.6
85.1
84.4
80.3
76.8
73.1
72.1
70.5
65.9
65.1
63.8
63.4
61.7
58.9
56.7
56.1
52.6
51.7
50.1
49.8
47.4
44.6
43.6
42.4
39.8
39.5
39.1
38.5
37.5
33.1
31.9
30.9
29.6
28.2
25.8
23.8

9

It is evident that the world’s leading emitters account for a strikingly large
percentage of the world’s emissions. Indeed, the United States and China, by themselves,
are responsible for about 40% of the world’s total. Most of the world’s nations, including
many poor countries, are trivial contributors. Estimates suggest that the largest
contributors are likely to continue to qualify as such—but that major shifts will occur,
above all with emissions growth in China and India, and emissions reductions in Russia
and Germany.
Table 2: Carbon Dioxide Emissions Changes, 1990–200420
Country
China
United States
India
South Korea
Iran
Indonesia
Saudi Arabia
Brazil
Spain
Pakistan
Poland
EU-25
Germany
Ukraine
Russia

Change,
1990–2004
108.3%
19.8%
87.5%
104.6%
110.7%
137.7%
85.6%
67.8%
59.0%
96.6%
–15.3%
1.6%
–12.2%
–47.1%
–24.8%

With these trends, we can project changes to 2030. At that time, the developing
world is expected to contribute no less than 55% of total emissions, with 45% coming
from developed nations.21 The United States is expected to be well below China. Here is
a projection of changes in emissions rates over time.22
Table 3: Relative Contributions of Annual Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Country/Region
23
(Approximate % of Worldwide Emissions)
United States
OECD Europe
China
India
Japan
Africa

1990
23.5%
19.3%
10.5%
2.7%
4.8%
3.1%

2003
22.7%
16.9%
15.3%
4.1%
4.9%
3.5%

2004
22.0%
16.3%
17.5%
4.1%
4.7%
3.4%

2010
20.1%
14.6%
21.1%
4.2%
4.1%
3.7%

2015
19.4%
13.4%
22.4%
4.4%
3.8%
3.8%

2020
18.8%
12.4%
23.9%
4.7%
3.5%
3.9%

2025
18.7%
11.6%
25.0%
4.9%
3.3%
3.9%

2030
18.5%
10.9%
26.2%
5.0%
3.0%
3.9%

20

Emissions of CO2 from energy-related sources only. See International Energy Agency, CO2 Emissions
From Fuel Combustion 1971-2004 II.4-II.7 (2006).
21
US Energy Information Administration, supra note.
22
Id.
23
Id.
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For our purposes, the most noteworthy changes involve the world’s two most
populous nations, India and China, which will be responsible for nearly one-third of the
world’s emissions in the relatively near future. And while this projection is fairly recent,
it is already out of date because of unanticipatedly explosive emissions growth in the
developing world. For example, China apparently surpassed the United States in CO2
emissions in June 2007 or perhaps before.24
It should be clear, from these figures, why the developing countries are most
unlikely to be sympathetic to an approach that allocates emissions rights on the basis of
existing emissions levels. Their own emissions are expanding rapidly, and such an
approach would be especially costly to them, because it would force them to purchase
emissions rights from other nations in order to develop at current rates. For example,
India is not likely to be especially enthusiastic about the idea that if it is to develop at the
rate indicated by “business as usual,” it must spend a great deal of money to obtain
permits from (say) the United States, Russia, China, and Japan. Notwithstanding this
point, it might be tempting to infer, from the numbers projected over the next decades,
that in an international agreement, China and the United States should be given roughly
the same level of emissions rights, and that the treatment of India should parallel the
treatment of Japan. An approach of this kind would build on that of the Kyoto Protocol,
which, as noted, requires percentage reductions from the status quo.
The most obvious response is that the figures for per capita emissions are
radically different. On a per capita basis, China and India emerge as far more modest
contributors, ranking well below Barbados, Croatia, Hungary, and Uzbekistan. To see the
dramatic differences between national emissions and per capita emissions, consider the
following:

24

See Audra Ang, China Overtakes U.S. as Top CO2 Emitter, Associated Press Online, June 21, 2007
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Table 4: GHG Emissions—Tons CO2 Per Person in 200425
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Country
Qatar
Kuwait
Luxembourg
Brunei
United Arab Emirates
Bahrain
United States of America
Equatorial Guinea
Australia
Canada
Trinidad & Tobago
Saudi Arabia
Finland
Estonia
Oman
Czech Republic
Taiwan
Palau
Kazakhstan
Singapore
Netherlands
Belgium
Nauru
Russian Federation
Ireland
Korea (South)
Germany
Japan
Cyprus
Denmark
Austria
Israel
South Africa
Norway
United Kingdom
Greece
European Union (25)
Libya
Spain
Italy
Turkmenistan
Slovenia
New Zealand

Tons CO2
Per Person
50.3
28.6
25.8
24.4
24.1
22.9
20.1
18.0
17.5
17.2
16.8
15.2
13.8
13.3
12.6
12.3
12.2
11.9
11.9
11.8
11.5
11.4
11.2
11.0
10.7
10.5
10.4
10.2
9.8
9.7
9.4
9.4
9.2
9.2
9.2
8.9
8.8
8.7
8.3
8.3
8.3
8.2
8.1

25

Tables generated by World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool, available at
http://cait.wri.org/cait.php?page=yearly. Excludes land use change.
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44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Poland
Iceland
Slovakia
Serbia & Montenegro
Ukraine
Belarus
France
Seychelles
Bahamas
Malta
Sweden
Portugal
Bulgaria
Iran
Switzerland
Malaysia
Hungary
Venezuela
Barbados
Suriname
Uzbekistan
Antigua & Barbuda
Croatia
Lebanon
Romania
Macedonia, FYR
Jamaica
Mexico
Bosnia & Herzegovina
China
Chile
Lithuania

8.0
7.9
7.4
7.0
6.9
6.7
6.6
6.5
6.3
6.3
6.2
6.2
6.1
6.1
6.0
6.0
5.8
5.4
5.3
5.2
5.1
5.1
5.0
4.8
4.4
4.3
4.1
4.1
4.0
4.0
3.9
3.8

The most striking point here is that while China has become the world’s leading
national emitter of greenhouse gases, its per capita contributions remain fairly modest,
ranking it near the bottom of the list of the seventy-five highest contributors. China’s per
capita emissions are merely one-fifth those of the United States, making it natural to
question whether the two nations should be treated similarly in a climate change
agreement. The case of India may be even more pertinent. India’s rapidly growing
contributions rank it among the world’s leaders on an absolute basis, but its per capita
emissions are less than a third of those of China, about a sixth of those of France, and
about one-fifteenth of those of the United States, ranking it 122nd in the world.26
It should be clear that per capita allocations would produce radically different
distributional effects from allocations based on the national status quo. With per capita
emissions rights, the world’s largest nations – China and India – would be significant net
26

Id.
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gainers. Indeed, their emissions rights would probably be worth hundreds of billions of
dollars. The principal losers would be the nations now having high per capita emissions.
The biggest loser, by far, would probably be the United States; indeed, the losses to the
United States would likely be in the hundreds of billions of dollars too.27 (For a simple
comparison, those losses would, after a period of a decade, be well in excess of the cost
of the Iraq War.28) Because of their high per capita emissions rates, Canada and Australia
would lose a great deal as well.
With this background, we should be able to glimpse the intuitive argument on
behalf of per capita allocations. Nations are not people; they are collections of people. A
citizen of China should not be given emissions rights that are a small fraction of those of
a citizen of the United States. Nor should a citizen of India be given emissions rights that
are a small fraction of those of a citizen of Japan. Each person should count for no more
and no less than one.29 As we shall see, this intuition might be grounded in concerns of
either welfare or fairness. But before we investigate these issues, it is necessary to
untangle some complexities. An initial task is to obtain a better understanding of the
effects of a per capita approach.

II. The Effects of a Per-Capita Permit System
A. A Simple Example
Suppose that a firm consumes energy (and other inputs) to create goods that it
sells on the market. Let us suppose that for every unit of energy (however defined) that
the firm consumes, it generates greenhouse gases that have a social cost of $10.
One approach to greenhouse gas regulation would involve taxation.30 In this
example, the optimal tax would be $10 per unit of energy—the amount necessary to
ensure that the firm uses a unit of energy only when the private benefit exceeds the social
cost Alternatively (and identically), the firm could be prohibited from consuming energy
unless it bought a permit from the government. The permit would have a price of $10.
Let us stipulate that if the permit is traded, the price will be $10 as well.

27

Under the status quo approach, the United States would be allocated about 20 percent of the permits (see
Table 7). Under a per capita approach, the United States would be allocated about 5 percent of the permits
(the U.S. share of the global population). Assuming that the price of a permit is $25 per metric ton of CO2
(the current price in the EU market) and enough permits are supplied to permit the output rate of 30 billion
metric tons per year (roughly the current global rate), then moving from the status quo approach (6 billion
tons) to the per capita approach (1.5 billion tons) would cost the United States about $112.5 billion per
year. These are back-of-the-envelope calculations intended to give a rough sense of the magnitude
involved, and should be taken with many grains of salt.
28
See Scott Wallsten, The Economic Cost of the Iraq War, Economists’ Voice (Jan. 2006), available at
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1134&context=ev.
29
See Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus, supra note.
30
This approach is defended in William Nordhaus, The Challenge of Global Warming: Economic Models
and
Environmental
Policy
(2007),
available
at
http://www.econ.yale.edu/
~nordhaus/DICEGAMS/dice_mss_060707_pub.pdf.
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The tax system and the permit system would raise revenue as well as deter the
emission of greenhouse gases. In this example, each system would generate revenue of
$10 per unit of energy. That money could be spent in any way; for example, the revenue
could go into the treasury of the government that levied the tax or sold the permit, and
then used for ordinary budget expenditures or to lower general taxes. Note that the
revenue raised would partially but not fully offset the immediate loss to consumer
welfare. Firms would pass the tax along to consumers, who would either pay the higher
price (and have less money to buy other things) or buy fewer energy-intensive goods.
However, we assume that in the aggregate people are better off: the environmental
benefits exceed the welfare losses from reduced consumption.31 Otherwise, there would
be no reason to negotiate a climate treaty.
Now imagine that the world consists of two nations, Rich State and Poor State.
Rich State has a large economy and relatively few people, while Poor State has a small
economy and relatively many people. (For concreteness, we might assume that Rich State
is analogous to the United States and that Poor State is analogous to India.) Suppose that
Rich State consumes 100 units of energy at the time that the climate treaty goes into
force, while Poor State consumes 20 units of energy. (For simplicity, we assume that
Rich State and Poor State do not trade; citizens of each country consume the output of
firms in that country.) Rich State has 5 citizens, while Poor State has 20 citizens. Thus,
Rich State consumes 20 units of energy per citizen; Poor State consumes one unit of
energy per citizen. Table 5 displays this information.
Table 5: An Example
Rich State
Poor State

Aggregate Energy
Consumption
100
20

Energy Consumption
per Capita
20
1

Population
5
20

The tax system would require the government of each country to levy a $10-perunit tax on each firm. Rich State would tax 100 units of energy and receive revenues of
$1000, while Poor State would tax 20 units of energy and receive revenues of $200.
Under the permit system, the treaty would authorize Rich State to sell 100 permits and
Poor State to sell 20 permits. As Table 6 shows, the distributive effects would be the
same: Rich State would raise $1000 in revenue and Poor State would raise $200 in
revenue.
Table 6: Taxes versus Permits
Rich State
Poor State

Aggregate energy
consumption
100
20

Tax per unit of
energy
$10
$10

Tax revenues
$1000
$200

Equivalent permits
at $10/permit
100
20

31

We bracket the question whether and how animals should be treated. See Wayne Hsiung and Cass R.
Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1695 (2007).
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We will call this the status quo approach because it takes as its baseline the
relative use of energy in the status quo.32 If one thinks of the treaty as “creating” permits,
then the treaty would distribute more permits to Rich State than to Poor State, just
because Rich State consumes more energy than Poor State. The treaty would create 120
permits, and give 100 permits to Rich State and 20 permits to Poor State. Note that the
effect of this treaty is identical to the tax approach described above.
B. Alternative Approaches
As noted, the status quo approach to distribution is based on the amount of energy
consumption at the time the treaty enters into force; it is analogous to the approach taken
in the Kyoto Protocol.33 Because Rich State consumes five times as much energy as Poor
State, Rich State receives five times as many permits as Poor State. And because wealthy
countries consume more energy than poor countries, the status quo approach seems to
favor wealthy countries. Of course, any judgment about whether particular nations are
“favored” depends on a baseline. Rich State will surely point out that its own firms pay
the revenue that it obtains from its extra permits, so that the effects wash out. It is a nice
puzzle why a uniform emissions tax is not generally or intuitively taken to be unfair
while the status quo approach to emissions right is often found objectionable – even
though the two are identical in their effects. But at least it can be said that the status quo
approach will generally give more permits to wealthy nations than to poor ones, holding
population constant, simply because wealthy nations tend to emit more greenhouse gases.
Other approaches are possible. For example, under the per-nation approach, the
treaty would distribute equal numbers of permits to every nation. Rich State and Poor
State would each receive 60 permits. This approach also does not seem intuitively fair.
All nations receive the same number of permits, but they must spread the revenues from
the permits among different numbers of citizens. In effect, Poor State’s 20 citizens
receive 3 permits each; Rich State’s five citizens receive 12 permits each (though it is
unlikely that the government would directly hand out permits to citizens).
The per-capita approach seems much better on this score. Each nation receives
permits in proportion to its population. In our example, Poor State has four times as
many citizens as Rich State, so Poor State receives 96 permits and Rich State receives 24
permits. Each citizen in both countries receives, in effect, 4.8 permits.
A final approach that we will consider will be called the redistributive approach.
Under this approach, all the permits are given to whichever country is poorer, at least up
until the point where their wealth is equalized. If we assume that Poor State is
sufficiently poorer than Rich State, the redistributive approach would require that all 120
permits be given to Poor State. Poor State would then sell 20 permits to its own firms
and 100 to Rich State’s firms, thus acquiring all the revenue from the permit system.
Table 7 displays this information.
32

In the literature, this approach is often called the “business-as-usual,” “historical baseline,” or
grandfathering approach. See e,g., Roberts and Parks, supra, at 139.
33
See Barrett, supra note, at 358-98.
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Table 7: Four Permit Allocation Schemes
Status quo
Per nation
Per capita
Permits Per capita Permits Per capita Permits Per capita
Rich State
100
20
60
12
24
4.8
Poor State
20
1
60
3
96
4.8
Note: Calculate revenues in aggregate and per capita by multiplying by $10

Redistributive
Permits Per capita
0
0
120
6

Note that other approaches are possible, including mixed approaches that fall
between the various approaches described above. For example, one could allocate
permits on the basis of a formula that weights both population size and poverty.34 For
simplicity, however, we will confine our discussion to the four approaches described
above: status quo, per-nation, per capita, and redistributive.
C. A Note on Ex Post Efficiency
From what we will call the “ex post efficiency” perspective (our reasons for using
this term will become clear later), all of these approaches are identical (assuming that the
trading system works as planned35). Ex post efficiency requires that energy users bear the
social (climate) cost of energy use. If that cost is $10 per unit of energy, then either a $10
tax should be used, or states should create the number of permits such that the market
price is $10. All of our approaches allow states to set the price of the permits at $10 or
whatever the optimal price is, so they are all equally efficient.
The only differences between the approaches are distributive. As we saw, under
the status quo approach, Rich State’s government would receive 100 permits and Poor
State’s government would receive 20 permits. Rich State would sell those 100 permits to
the Rich State firms, and Poor State would sell the 20 permits to the Poor State firms.
Under the per-state approach, Poor State would sell 20 of the permits to Poor State firms
and 40 of its permits to the remaining Rich State firms that were unable to purchase the
60 permits distributed to the Rich State government. Under the per capita approach, a
similar outcome would occur. If Poor State receives 96 permits, its government would
sell 76 of the permits to Rich State firms. The same is true for the redistributive
approach.
D. Distribution
We have seen that under the status quo system, Rich State would raise revenues
of $1000 while Poor State would raise revenues of only $200. By contrast, the per-nation
system would give Rich State revenues of $600 and Poor State revenues of $600. The
per capita system, where Poor State is four times as large as Rich State, gives Poor State
revenues of $960 and Rich State revenues of $240. And under the redistributive system,
Poor State would receive $1200 and Rich State would receive $0.

34

See Bodansky, supra, for a long list of proposals that weigh these factors and more.
For discussion, see Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note, at 149-165 (showing that costs of climate change
agreement are greatly decreased with significant emissions trading).

35
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These are points about redistribution across nations. But it is also important to
understand the per-capita redistributive effect of the various policies. Under the status
quo system, Rich State receives $200 per capita, while Poor State receives $10 per capita.
Under the per-nation system, Rich State receives $120 per capita, while Poor State
receives $20 per capita. Under the per capita system, Rich State receives $48 per capita,
as does Poor State. Under the redistributive approach, Rich State receives $0 per capita,
while Poor State receives $60 per capita. (See Table 7, above.)
To obtain a full understanding of the distributive effects of the alternatives, we
need to take into account the benefit side of the climate treaty. The permit system would
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, resulting in mitigation of climate change. These
benefits could be the same for Rich State and for Poor State, or different. It is well
known that the benefits of reducing climate change are not constant across nations.36
Some nations have far more to lose than others from (say) 2.5 C warming, and from such
warming, some nations are likely to be net gainers.37 Under prominent projections, India
and African nations are especially vulnerable, and the United States and China have
significantly less to lose; Russia might even gain.38 Here again we might consider both
aggregate and per-capita effects. Suppose that the mitigation benefits of the treaty
produce benefits of $2000 for one state and $0 for the other state, or $1000 for both
states.39 If the benefits accrue to Rich State in the first case, then each of its few citizens
receive a benefit of $400; if to Poor State, then each of its many citizens receive a benefit
of $100. In the second case, each Rich State citizen receives benefits worth $200 and
each Poor State citizen receives benefits of $50. Table 8 summarizes the discussion so
far.
Table 8: Distributive Effects of Permit Allocation Schemes
System
Status quo
Per-nation
Per capita
Redistrib.

System
Status quo

Permit
Distributio
n
100/20
60/60
24/96
0/120
Per Capita
Permit
Distribution
20/1

Aggregate
Revenue
1000/200
600/600
240/960
0/1200
Per Capita
Revenue
200/10

R: $2000
P: $0
3000/200
2600/800
2240/960
2000/1200

Aggregate Net Benefits
R: $0
R: $1000
P: $2000
P: $1000
2000/1200
1000/2200
600/2600
1600/1600
240/2960
1240/1960
0/3200
1000/2200

R: $400
P: $0
600/10

Per Capita Net Benefits
R: $0
R: $200
P: $100
P: $50
200/110
400/60

36

See, e.g., Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note, at 91; David Anthoff et al., Equity Weighting and the
Marginal Costs and Benefits of Climate Change (2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=983032
37
For an overview, see Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, Georgetown L.J.
(forthcoming 2008).
38
Id.
39
A related point is that the cost of adjusting to the implicit carbon tax may vary across countries. Some
countries have more abundant sources of clean energy, and some countries have industries that can more
cheaply switch to alternative sources of energy. For a discussion in the context of the differential effects of
per capita and historical approaches, see Joseph E. Aldy, Divergence in State-Level Per Capita Carbon
Dioxide Emissions, 83 Land Econ. 353 (2007).
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Per-nation
Per capita
Redistrib.

12/3
4.8/4.8
0/6

120/30
48/48
0/60

520/30
448/48
400/60

120/130
48/148
0/160

320/80
248/98
200/110

The first panel displays aggregate figures; the second panel displays per capita figures.
The first figure in each cell displays Rich State’s (or Rich State citizens’) gain; the
second figure does the same for Poor State. The Permit Distribution column displays the
distribution of permits, as depicted in Table 7. The Aggregate Revenue column
multiplies these numbers by 10 in order to produce revenues from the sale of permits.
The final three columns display the net treaty benefits (revenue plus climate benefits)
under the three different assumptions about the differential impacts on the climate of an
effective climate treaty. The cells with bold figures show outcomes that are most nearly
equal for the two states.
One can immediately see that there is a large difference between equalizing
revenue (Column 3) and equalizing the net benefits of the treaty (Columns 4-6).
Focusing on per capita effects (Panel 2), we can see that the per capita approach equalizes
revenues, but it does not equalize treaty benefits under any of the three assumptions.
Indeed, equalization of revenues can occur amidst gross disparities in treaty benefits – a
point that raises serious questions about the idea that per capita distributions are fair.
We will return to these points in Part III.
III. The Per Capita Approach in Principle
A. From a Welfarist Perspective
1. The Case for the Per Capita Approach
In discussions about climate treaties, defenders of the per capita approach argue
that this approach is fairer than likely alternative approaches, such as the status quo
approach.40 This argument is especially prominent in the developing world, where it is
asked: Why should wealthy nations be given an entitlement to their existing emissions
rights?41 This question seems to be one of fairness, to which we will turn in due course.
But it can also be translated into a plausible welfarist argument, to the effect that the per
capita approach is more likely to increase social welfare than any imaginable alternative.
It makes sense to begin with the welfarist argument, which is in some ways more
tractable, and which will illuminate the fairness questions as well.
Welfarists care about two things: maximizing the size of the pie and distributing it
equally. The larger the pie, the more that is available for everyone to consume, and all
else equal, welfare should rise with consumption.42 At the same time, most welfarists
40

See note supra.
See, e.g., Sagar, supra note; Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus, supra note.
42
We put to one side some prominent puzzles about the relationship between happiness and income. See
Robert Frank, Luxury Fever (1992) (suggesting that relative wealth matters, not absolute wealth); Richard
Layard, Happiness (2004) (exploring ambiguous relationship between wealth and happiness).
41
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believe that the welfare, or utility, that is obtained from an additional good is declining.43
If you have zero apples, you are willing to pay a lot for one apple. If you have ten apples,
you are willing to pay much less, or zero, for an eleventh. Thus, if the entire pie is given
to one person, social welfare is not maximized. Ideally, the pie should be maximized,
and then it should be divided into equal pieces, each of which is given to one member of
society — but only assuming no disincentive effects, which might decrease the size of the
pie. We can easily see that if disincentive effects are small, welfarists would advocate
redistribution of resources from wealthy nations to poor nations, or at least from wealthy
people in wealthy and poor nations to poor people in wealthy and poor nations.44
With respect to maximizing the size of the pie, we observed above that the per
capita approach is no less ex post efficient than any other approach. The reason is that
the climate treaty advances ex post efficiency by giving individuals and governments
incentives to minimize their emissions of greenhouse gases. Optimal incentives will
depend on the quantity of permits but not how they are distributed. As long as
decisionmakers choose the right quantity, the size of the pie will be maximized.
Efficiency, in the crucial sense, is not at stake in the choice among the four approaches.
Thus, the welfare effects of different schemes depend entirely on their
distributional effects; other things being equal, distribution to those who are poor will
increase welfare. The per capita approach might well seem to have attractive
distributional effects and for that reason attractive welfare effects. To the extent that the
larger countries tend to be poorer, the per capita approach will help poor people, and
because poor people have the highest marginal utility for a dollar, helping poor people
will maximize global welfare. Certainly compared to the status quo approach, per capita
allocations seem supportable on welfarist grounds; at first glance, they seem to be the
right way to proceed. The examples of the United States on the one hand, and China and
India on the other, are highly salient, because the former is rich and the latter two are
poor by comparison. To the extent that the per capita approach would require the United
States to give hundreds of billions of dollars to China and India, it might seem desirable
on welfarist grounds.45
2. Objections and Concerns
1. Distribution. We have said that welfarists care about equal distribution,
believing that money has diminishing marginal utility. From their perspective, the per
capita approach has three serious defects. First and most fundamentally, the per capita
approach is attractive from that perspective only insofar as larger states tend to be poorer.
Not all large states are poor, and not all small states are rich; indeed, the opposite is
frequently the case. The United States has a population of 301 million and per capita
GDP of $46,000. Bhutan has a population of 2 million and per capita GDP of $1,400.
43

See Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, New Foundations for Cost-Benefit Analysis (2005). Note that
this approach assumes that interpersonal comparisons of utility are possible. On that issue, see id.;
Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being (Jon Elster and John Roemer eds. 1993).
44
See, e.g., Singer, supra; Posner, supra.
45
See note supra.
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The per capita approach seems to be a crude and even arbitrary way to redistribute
wealth, certainly compared to the pure redistributive approach that gives few or no
permits to rich states and all or most of the permits to poor states, regardless of size. We
assumed away this problem in our example above because we stipulated that Poor State
was both bigger and (as befits its name) poorer. But that assumption (driven perhaps by
the examples of the United States, China, and India) is unrealistic.
Indeed, the relationship between population and wealth turns out to be essentially
zero. For a demonstration, consider Figure 1.
Figure 1: Relationship Between Population and Per Capita Wealth46

11

Population and Wealth
USA
NOR
CAN
HKG
DNK
CHE NLD
IRL
JPN
BEL AUS
FIN AUT
SWE
DEU
FRA
GBR
ITA
NZL
ESP
ISR PRT
ATG
BRB
SVN
GRC
MUS
KNA
CZE
SVK HUN
TTO
ARG
SYC
CHL
MYS POL
EST URY
MEX RUS
HRV BLR
GAB
LVALTU
ZAF
DMA
BRA
VCT BLZ
THA
TUR
TUN KAZ
VEN
LCA
GRD
PAN
IRN
CRI
BGR
LBN DOM
COL
SWZ MKD
DZA UKR
GEO
PRY
PER
SLV
SYR ROM EGY
CPV
GTM
JOR
MAR
JAM
IDN
GNQ
ECU
PHL
ALB
KGZ AZE LKA
GIN
ARM
BOLZWE
MDA
HND CMR
PAK
NIC SENCIV
BGD
LSO
COM
NPL
GHAKEN
TJK
STP
BEN
MLI
HVOMOZ
UGA
RWA
ZMB
NER
TGOTCD
MDG
YEM
MWI
NGA
GNB
ETH
BDI
TZA
ISL MAC

CHN
IND

6

7

Log Real Per Capita GDP
8
9
10

LUX

4

6

8
10
Log Population

12

14

Clearly, there are rich small states (upper left), and poor big states (lower right), and
everything in between. There is no statistically significant correlation between
population and GDP per capita.
Second, the permits—in the scheme that we describe—are distributed to both
greenhouse gas winners and losers. Some poor states will become far poorer as a result

46

The figure shows the natural logs of per capita GDP and population averaged over the years 1980 to
2000. Taking the natural log of the variables makes the data points easier to see in a manageable figure.
The correlation coefficient between per capita GDP and population is -0.036 and is not statistically
significant. The data are taken from Alan Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table
Version 6.2, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income, and Prices at the University of
Pennsylvania, September 2006, available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
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of climate change; others are less vulnerable.47 Some rich states will face serious adverse
effects from climate change; others are less vulnerable.48 Some poor states, and some rich
states, may even be net gainers from climate change.49 Ideally, permits should be
distributed in light of these consequences, but the per capita approach fails to take them
into account. If distribution is our concern, why should two highly populated poor nations
receive the same number of permits from a program from which one gains a lot and
another a little – or from which one gains a lot and another actually loses?
Third, the permits are allocated to the governments of poor states, not to the
citizens of poor states. This distinction matters because nearly all poor states have a class
of wealthy elites, and these wealthy elites usually control the government or have
considerable influence over it. Given that the governments in these states already are
unenthusiastic about redistributing wealth from the elites to the poor, it is questionable
that they will use the wealth generated by the permit scheme to help the poor. They may
well prefer to help the rich. We will return to this problem in Part IV.
The first two problems were illustrated in Table 5, above. The key point is that
the intuitive attractiveness of the per capita approach depends on seeing it in isolation
from all of the effects of a climate treaty. Once we take these factors into account, the
per capita approach appears far less attractive, and on plausible assumptions, indefensible
from the standpoint of the very accounts that most at first sight justify it.
We agree that as a matter of actual practice, these defects are not necessarily fatal
to the per capita approach. Everything depends on the alternatives. One might argue in
response not that the per capita approach is ideal, but that it is superior to a system that is
its most likely alternative—one that uses status quo energy consumption as the baseline
and thus favors people living in wealthy and wasteful countries. Perhaps this response is
correct. But it must acknowledge the underlying problem, which is that the per capita
system is only indirectly connected to the underlying normative goal—indeed, so
indirectly that it is conceivable in principle (although most unlikely in practice) that it has
worse distributive effects than the status quo approach.
A welfarist should favor redistribution to the world’s poor to the extent that doing
so is feasible and does not excessively reduce aggregate global welfare. But if one is a
welfarist, there is no reason to think that the per capita approach to climate regulation is
the right way to redistribute wealth and thus to increase global welfare. It would be much
better to redistribute all resources than to redistribute shares of the atmosphere’s capacity
to absorb greenhouse gases; it would be much better to redistribute resources to poor
people rather than to poor nations; and it would be better to redistribute to the poor
nations rather than to the large nations. From the welfarist perspective, a sensible
redistributive policy would follow these general principles. And if redistribution is to
occur in the specific context of a climate treaty, the redistributive approach, sketched
47

Thus, for example, India is far more vulnerable than is China. See Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note, at
91.
48
Thus, for example, the United States is far less vulnerable than many nations in Europe. Id. at 91.
49
See id. (projecting, for example, significant net gains for Russia).
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above, would be much better than the per capita approach. If it is impossible—politically
or technically—to redistribute all resources, or to follow that redistributive approach,
then one needs to explain why it is possible—politically or technically—to adopt a per
capita approach. And one would need to explain why it might be easier to redistribute to
large states (in such a way that benefits the poor) than to redistribute to poor states. We
will return to this theme in Part IV.
2. More on Welfare: Ex Ante Efficiency. Arguments in favor of per capita
distribution have, so far, focused on what we have called ex post efficiency effects, and
neglected the possible ex ante effects of the distribution scheme. We discussed the ex
post effects above, and showed that the ex post efficiency effects of the different schemes
are identical (or nearly so). The same cannot be said for ex ante efficiency. From that
standpoint, the effects are different, and the per capita approach has some significant
drawbacks.
To understand the difference between ex post and ex ante efficiency, recall that
any tax or cap-and-trade system that requires firms or individuals to internalize the social
cost of their greenhouse gas emissions is efficient, in the sense that under these schemes
firms and individuals will use energy only when the social benefits (including their own
profits or consumption) are greater than the social costs (including the costs to the
climate). We call this type of efficiency “ex post” because it addresses an existing
problem, though, to be sure, one that will continue into the future.
The ex ante effect of a climate treaty refers to its effect on future programs,
including those that have nothing to do with greenhouse gases. Any treaty will establish
a precedent on which states will rely, at least in part, as they negotiate additional treaties
in the future, treaties that will be needed to handle such global problems as terrorism,
crossborder transmission of diseases, and nation-building efforts in failed states. For
example, if the per capita approach is used for a climate treaty, then it will suggest itself
as a basis for allocating the costs of a terrorism treaty.
Similar assumptions are routinely made about domestic programs. For example,
the U.S. government could alleviate poverty by announcing one day that it will take most
of the wealth of rich Americans and give it to poor Americans. Such a program is not
inefficient in the ex post sense: given that the rich have already accumulated their wealth,
they cannot retroactively be deterred from working hard. The program will have
prospective effect, however. Even if announced as a one-time event, people will assume
that if the government implements such a program today, it might do so again tomorrow.
This assumption will influence their ex ante behavior, reducing their incentive to work
and save.50
50

These effects are addressed in the law and economics literature on legal transitions. See, e.g., Louis
Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509 (1986). This literature focuses
on domestic law, where it is clearer than in the international context that a government that adopts certain
policies or practices toward legal transitions—compensating or grandfathering those injured by the
transition, for example—will affect the incentives of people to anticipate legal change. We extend this
literature to the international setting; there is no reason to think that the differences in settings should affect
the analysis. The transitions literature ignores what we have called “ex post efficiency,” instead assuming
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Suppose, then, that a climate treaty based on the per-capita approach established a
precedent. How might such a precedent influence behavior, compared to the baseline
status quo approach? It would create two perverse incentives.
First, the per capita principle would establish that the most highly populated states
would obtain the greatest benefits from international cooperation. Governments would
be rewarded for pursuing fertility policies that maximize the size of the population.
To see why, consider a state with population X and another state with population
2X. Suppose that a future treaty would limit the spread of infectious diseases, creating
benefits of Y. The states would need to negotiate a division of the surplus. With the per
capita principle in place, the state with the larger population would be able to claim a
larger portion of the surplus.
From a redistributive perspective, this result might seem fair (unless the people in
the larger state are richer), but in terms of prospective incentives, states now have one
more reason to grow and to avoid shrinking. This incentive is especially perverse from
the perspective of climate change, because more people will consume more of the earth’s
resources (though, conceivably, more efficiently). On the other side, the climate treaty,
to the extent that it fixes the initial number of permits, will also restrain growth. And it is
true that given the relatively low amount of international cooperation, one might doubt
that the incentive to expand population is particularly strong. To evaluate the extent of
the problem we need to know the magnitude and not merely the direction of the incentive
effect. Still, it is a cost of the per capita system that should be kept in mind.51
Second, to the extent that the per-capita approach favors poorer countries (and
that is its only normatively attractive feature), the principle would establish that poorer
states would obtain the greatest benefits from international cooperation. Governments
that adopt sensible policies that promote economic growth would be penalized by this
principle.
This incentive is also perverse. Most states get rich because they have good
institutions, not because they are lucky enough to have natural resources.52 Citizens
invest in creating and maintaining good institutions because good institutions deliver
that whatever legal change that is introduced is dictated by efficiency. The environmental literature, by
contrast, focuses on ex post efficiency (for example, the choice between permits systems and taxes) and
generally although not always ignores ex ante issues. For a discussion, see Jonathan R. Nash, Allocation
and Uncertainty: Strategic Responses to Environmental Grandfathering, unpub. m.s. 18-22 (2008).
51
These perverse population incentives have long been recognized. However, many scholars seem to think
that these incentives can be eliminated as long as allocations of permits are made with reference to a past
distribution of population rather than to future populations. See, e.g., Singer, supra, at 36. Such an approach
would not address the perverse incentives of the precedent for future treaties, when high-population states
will invoke the climate treaty as a basis for demanding more favorable treatment.
52
In fact, development economists have gone so far as to identify a “resource curse”: countries with
valuable natural resources often do worse than those that lack them. See Richard M. Auty, Sustaining
Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (1993).
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wealth and other benefits. A redistributive principle such as the per capita rule implicitly
punishes states that do well, while rewarding states that do poorly.
The goal of development aid over the past decades was precisely the opposite: to
give governments of developing countries an incentive to adopt sound economic policies
that promote growth. Because of fears that foreign aid would provide incentives not to
grow, donors made concerted efforts to condition aid on the adoption of sensible growth
policies.53 The per capita principle—indeed, any redistributive principle—is at war with
the lessons of development policy, and would weaken the pro-growth incentives that are
currently given to developing states.
What system, then, is optimal for ex ante efficiency? The ideal principle would
give states an incentive to identify in advance global problems and negotiate treaties to
solve them, and otherwise not affect their incentives to control their populations, invest in
institutions, and so forth. Such a principle would be, at a minimum, a form of
international Paretianism, so that states believe that they will not be made worse off by a
legal solution, a belief that would discourage states from entering treaty negotiations.
But treaties that solve problems generate surpluses beyond the amount necessary
to make states indifferent between entering and not entering a treaty. What should be
done with the surplus? It is tempting to think that one can distribute the surplus without
affecting incentives ex ante, but this is highly implausible. (If one can, then one would
probably want to distribute the surplus to the poorest countries rather than on a per capita
basis, which, as we have been arguing, is morally arbitrary.)
From an efficiency perspective, the best use of the surplus would be to reward the
states that had taken steps in advance of the treaty to abate greenhouse gases.54 These
states would probably be the European states that accepted binding reductions under the
Kyoto Protocol, though there are complexities here, since not all European states
accepted meaningful reductions and others were simply taking advantage of independent
technological and demographic changes in their country.55
The larger point is that such a distribution would establish a precedent to the
effect that when a global problem exists, states that respond quickly and in advance of a
treaty will not be penalized. With this principle in place, states would be more likely to
act quickly and to negotiate a treaty regime rather than drag their feet. For example, if
states ever need to enter a new treaty that regulates cybercrime, they will know that first
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movers that have implemented controls that reduce dangers to other states will not be
penalized. Instead, the treaty will ensure that these states will be rewarded in some way.
It emerges that from the standpoint of ex ante efficiency, the per capita approach
has serious drawbacks, even when compared with the seemingly unattractive status quo
approach. As we have indicated, these drawbacks cannot be evaluated without knowing
the magnitude of the effects. If, for example, a climate change agreement had small
consequences for population growth, and had little effect on incentives in the context of
other international agreements, the drawbacks would not be a substantial concern. Our
only point is that they must be investigated in order to obtain a full account of the welfare
effects of the per capita approach.
B. Fairness
Ideas about fairness are playing a significant role in debates over the proper
approach to climate change.56 Fairness can be specified in multiple different ways. We
venture three specifications here in an effort to see whether the per capita approach can
be defended on fairness grounds.
1. Fairness and the veil of ignorance. Many people reject the idea that questions
of global justice should be approached in welfarist terms.57 In their view, the goal is not
to promote aggregate social welfare; it is instead to do what fairness requires. Arguments
of this kind often posit a veil of ignorance, or “original position,” from which allocations
might be chosen.58 In the standard version of this argument, people behind the veil do not
know various circumstances of their lives; they do not know their place in society, their
social status, their class position, or even their natural assets (such as intelligence and
strength).59 The central claim is that the principles that would be chosen behind the veil
qualify as fair, because they ensure that outcomes are not a product of factors or
considerations that are irrelevant from the moral point of view.60
Many people who are attracted to this claim also want to suppose that choosers
are made ignorant of the nation in which they might find themselves.61 If deprived of that
information, what distributive principles would they select? It is possible that in the
international context, as in the domestic one, they would select welfarist ones. Perhaps
people would choose to maximize overall welfare, if placed behind the veil.62 But it is
also possible that they would take particular care to protect the least well-off, perhaps
through a version of Rawls’ difference principle, which permits inequalities only to the
extent that they operate to the advantage of the least advantaged.63 There is a vigorous
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debate over the application of that principle or imaginable variations to the international
domain.64 Rawls himself believed that there are real difficulties in adapting the difference
principle to the international context.65 But even in that context, the idea of a veil of
ignorance may turn out to be helpful.66 Some philosophers believe that the best approach
specifies a floor constraint, ensuring that everyone is moved above some threshold.67
Even without a floor constraint, international agreements might be developed with close
attention to the veil of ignorance, which may well require a great deal of redistribution
across national boundaries.68
We need not pause over the philosophical complexities here.69 The basic point is
that welfarism is rejected by many people who believe that severe deprivation for some
cannot be justified by large welfare benefits for many, and that fairness is often taken to
require attention to those who face such deprivation, whatever is suggested by the
welfarist calculus.70
Consider a common sense specification of this claim, adapted to the climate
change problem. Some nations are much richer than others, in a way that violates the
requirements of justice.71 Perversely, the status quo approach creates a kind of
entitlement to the continuation of practices that violate those requirements. No such
entitlement can be defended. Even if corrective justice does not require high emitting
states to compensate those nations that are at special risk,72 a climate change agreement
would be unacceptably unfair if it makes it more difficult for poor nations to develop –
especially because development is designed to remove their citizens from difficult
conditions and to achieve something closer to the threshold or to equality with wealthy
nations. A per capita approach is the most fair, because it allows every citizen to count
for no less and no more than one, in a way that respects the moral irrelevance of national
boundaries.73
We do not intend to challenge these general points about fairness here. Our basic
claim is that if they are taken as a defense of the per capita approach, they run into
serious difficulties. The reason is that the central objections to the welfarist argument
rematerialize when fairness, understood in the stated way, is our guide. To the extent that
some of the most populous states are wealthy, the per capita approach is not fair at all; to
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that extent, it has some of the same vices as the status quo approach. Per capita
allocations also have the disadvantage of giving numbers of permits to highly populated
nations that have relatively little to lose from climate change. And it remains true that
permits are allocated to the governments of poor states, not to the citizens of poor states,
and allocations to such governments may not help those who are most in need. If fairness
requires redistribution across national boundaries, the status quo approach runs into
significant trouble, and the per capita approach is better; but those interested in global
redistribution would hardly choose that approach among a menu of possibilities.
2. The atmosphere as common property. There is another type of fairness
argument, to the effect that the atmosphere, with its beneficial carbon-absorbing
characteristics, is common property, belonging to everyone in the world.74 A climate
treaty closes a commons, converting it into private property. It is only fair to distribute
the parcels of property to the former users of the commons, namely, everyone in the
world, on a per capita basis. One might draw an analogy to minerals discovered in the
sea bed under the high seas, which are outside the sovereignty of any country. The
Convention on the Law of the Sea provides that revenues from exploitation of these
minerals should be distributed “equitably.”75
But the analogy is at best partial and in fact reveals the limits of this argument. A
climate treaty, like a treaty allowing for the exploitation of minerals, has two effects of
present interest. First, both treaties generate revenues—for permit sellers, in the climate
case, and for mining companies, in the mineral case. Second, both treaties generate
benefits for consumers—people who benefit from abatement of climate change, and
people who benefit from the lower price of, say, oil. Because virtually everyone benefits
from lower oil prices, the effect is spread around the world. Thus, the only remaining
question in the case of the mineral treaty is how to distribute revenues fairly. In the
climate case, the climate effects are extremely variable—hurting some people very badly,
others not all, and benefiting still others. From the standpoint of fairness, it would be
stranger to ignore these latter effects while considering only the revenue effects. The
analogy to property is not helpful; it distracts from the relevant question, which is the
distribution of all treaty effects across the world’s population.
3. Frugality, profligacy, and related issues. Suppose that we understand the idea
of fairness not in redistributive terms, but as a requirement that similarly people be
treated similarly. As we saw above, the per capita system is not attentive to the
differential distributional effects of climate change and abatement costs, but in effect
gives every person the same asset. From one perspective, the main objection to this
feature of the per capita system is that it means that wealth does not necessarily go to the
poor. But holding wealth constant, it might seem unfair that frugal individuals who have
produced few greenhouse gas emissions receive the same payout as profligates who have
produced many. And it might seem unfair that people who are most hurt by climate
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change receive the same payout as those who are least hurt (or even benefited) by climate
change. Finally, we might think people who are most hurt by the abatement efforts
mandated by the climate treaty should receive some kind of compensation. Consider, for
example, low-income workers who commute to work and must pay higher bus fares or
fuel prices. One might argue that fairness requires that these people receive permits, so
that they do not bear a disproportionate cost of the treaty regime.

C. The Per Capita Approach as a Second-Best Standard
We have seen that in principle, significant global redistribution is plausibly
justified by considerations of both welfare and fairness. But in practice, such
redistribution is not occurring; for example, there is no evidence that the United States
wants to transfer hundreds of billions of dollars to poor people in India or China rather
than the tens of millions of dollars that are currently appropriated.76 In these
circumstances, defenders of per capita allocations might argue that their approach has
three virtues. First, the per capita approach might be feasible even if a preferred form of
redistribution is not. Second, such an approach might provide the basis for a kind of
incompletely theorized agreement among those who have different moral commitments,
or who are unsure about the appropriate moral commitments in the international domain.
Third, per capita allocation might, because of its simplicity and attractiveness, provide a
plausible focal point for political action – a basis for an international agreement to which
many nations could subscribe, even if it would be fanciful to suggest that wealthy nations
might sign an international agreement in which they agree to transfers hundreds of
billions of dollars to poor nations.77
We will return to feasibility in the next section. For the moment, let us add a
further consideration. Wealthy nations, including the United States, face serious risks
from climate change, and to reduce those risks, they need international cooperation.
Indeed, it is increasingly clear that they need cooperation from the developing world. To
obtain that cooperation, they might well be willing to expend resources that they would
not give in foreign aid. Consider some illustrative numbers.78 Suppose that the United
States would lose 3 percent in annual GDP from “business as usual,” in the form of no
international agreement at all. Suppose that the ideal international agreement would cost
the United States 0.5 percent in annual GDP, while reducing the 3 percent loss to a 1
percent loss, for a net gain of 1.5 percent. Suppose, however, that developing countries
reject this agreement, on the ground that its costs are too high and its benefits too low,
and that they seek either an agreement with different content or with some kind of
financial assistance. The different content might mean a worse cost-benefit ratio for the
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United States. On the stipulated numbers, the United States should be willing to pay up to
1.5 percent of annual GDP to obtain the benefits of an international agreement. And
indeed, there is evidence that wealthy nations are willing to pay nontrivial amounts to
poorer ones in return for their cooperation in international agreements.79
Whatever its implications, this argument does not support a per capita approach at
all. All that this argument says is that any climate agreement will create a surplus, and it
will be necessary, and possibly very difficult, for nations to decide how to divide that
surplus. If the United States would gain a great deal from a treaty, while a poor nation
such as China would gain a lot less, it might be necessary for the United States to accept
a smaller portion of the surplus than China obtains, even to gain less on a per capita basis
than China does. Meanwhile, India might lose more than the United States does, and
these bargaining dynamics might work out in the United States’ favor as between these
two states. In principle, it is plausible to think that relative wealth should matter to the
distribution of the surplus, so that on grounds of welfare or fairness, poor countries
should be entitled to a significant share, perhaps through financial assistance or some
kind of side-payment. But there is no particular reason to think that the type of bargain
that is welfare-maximizing, fair, or feasible should reflect relative population size than
something else—relative size of economy, relative advantages from a climate treaty, and
so forth.
A similar point could be made about the possibility that the per capita approach
could reflect an incompletely theorized agreement. Suppose that nations acknowledge
that certain moral principles guide international relations, or should, but that they
disagree about what those moral principles are.80 If one believes the rhetoric of
governments, one can identify a set of standard moral arguments. Among developing
nations, some argue that the rich world has obligations to the poor arising from the
history of colonial exploitation.81 Others argue that rich nations have obligations arising
from particular policies that they have adopted in the recent past and that continue in the
present—unfair tariffs that discriminate against agriculture, for example, or immigration
rules that drain away poor nations’ educated elites.82 Still others argue simply that
resources that exist outside the sovereign territory of each state should be shared.83 Some
rich nations are willing to acknowledge that they have an ethical obligation to provide aid
to the very poorest people; others say that they have an obligation to cooperate with poor
nations or not to interfere with them but not necessarily to give them aid.84
Observe that these different moral arguments have very different implications.
Even among the poor nations, whose views seem consistent at first sight, one can detect
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radically different implications of the different arguments. If one focuses on colonial
exploitation, then the major beneficiaries should be former colonies (including rich states
like Taiwan) and the major payers should be former empires (including Great Britain,
Russia, and Portugal but not so much the United States). The idea of colonial
exploitation suggests that former colonies should direct their claims at their former
masters, not to the rich world as a whole. India’s extra permits, for example, should
come out of Great Britain’s pocket. Similarly, if tariff policy is the source of complaints,
one would need to determine which tariff policies were supported by whom, and which
countries they harmed—and this is highly complex and controversial. And if tariff
polices that have adverse effects on other nations (and what tariff policies do not have
such effects?) should count, so should all other policies that have given rise to legitimate
grievances. One would thus need to keep in mind the particular grievances that some
poor countries have against other poor countries (India and Pakistan, Rwanda and
Burundi), and allocate permits accordingly.
It would seem to turn out that even if the rich nations owe extra permits to poor
nations, within the class of poor nations, permits would have to be distributed unequally
to account for current and past injustices. Generous treatment, such as the rich nations’
contributions to the victims of the recent South Asia tsunami would need to be
subtracted, lest rich nations hoard their generous impulses as offsets to permit regimes.
And all of this would need to be done in a manner that respected the views of those who
care about redistribution on grounds solely of redistributive justice or welfare
maximization.85
Within countries, moral disagreement of this type does not necessarily preclude
policy, even on issues that divide people sharply along moral lines. Typically, the policy
that emerges reflects an incompletely theorized agreement.86 People with different moral
views agree on a policy that is consistent with their different interests and different moral
views, while bracketing their remaining conflicts or putting off them until a later time.
For example, in the United States some people support affirmative action as a way to
overcome past injustices, while others defend it as a forward-looking policy for
promoting certain social goals, such as stability.87 The moral views have different
implications for how affirmative action should be designed and how long it will last, but
those holding these different views can sometimes agree on enough to put their weight
behind a program that furthers some of their goals but not others. Similarly, one might
argue that the per capita approach could reflect an incompletely theorized agreement
among nations and individuals with different but overlapping moral views about what
nations owe each other.

85

For an effort to see derive a distribution system that takes into account historical behavior, see A.D.
Sagar, Wealth, Responsibility, and Equity: Exploring an Allocation Framework for Global GHG
Emissions, 45 Climatic Change 511 (2000).
86
On such agreements in general, see Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996). On
the lack of concrete theoretical grounding for international agreements, see Barrett, Environment and
Statecraft, supra note.
87
See Kathleen Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 78 (1985).

31

This argument also is weak. None of the moral views described above would
support the claim that greenhouse gas permits should be distributed according to
population size, with the possible exception of the view that commons should be shared.
But even that view does not clearly distinguish between per-nation sharing and per-capita
sharing. If there is a common thread among these theories, it is the view that richer
nations have an ethical obligation to aid or cooperate with poor nations. But as we have
seen, poor nations and populous nations are not the same.

V. Feasibility Issues
Thus far our focus has been on issues of principle. A general lesson has been that
on grounds of welfare, there are reasons for significant redistribution to poor people in
poor nations, and for that reason, the redistributive approach seems far better than the per
capita approach, which seems in turn to be far better than the status quo approach. The
principal objection to this claim involves incentive effects. The question is whether the
welfare loss, from such effects, outweighs the welfare gain from redistribution. It is
entirely plausible to think that a climate change agreement that includes significant
redistribution will be better, on welfarist grounds, than one that does not. But any climate
change agreement must be feasible, and the constraints of feasibility impose significant
restrictions on the pursuit of ideals. The poignant irony is that insistence on the first-best
outcome, as a matter of principle, may make the climate change problem intractable, in a
way that could lead to disaster from the standpoint of the very nations that are poorest
and most vulnerable.88
A. State Consent and International Paretianism
Any realistic approach to climate regulation will have to come about through
changes in international law. Most serious discussion today focuses on a possible climate
treaty, because no nation can make a serious dent in anticipated warming on its own.89
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992 set the stage for
negotiations that culminated in the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, which obligated developed
nations to cut greenhouse gas emissions over a period of years; it imposed no emissions
reductions obligations on developing nations.90 The United States refused to ratify Kyoto,
in part because the United States would be obligated to make quite significant cuts,
imposing costs much greater, in terms of monetary expense, than those imposed on other
nations.91 In the most recent round of negotiations at Bali, the United States agreed to
resume negotiations with an eye toward joining a new treaty with binding greenhouse gas
emission abatement obligations a few years hence.92
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Treaties require the consent of treaty partners, and so states must believe that by
entering a treaty, they are serving their national interest. Of course the idea of national
interest can be specified in many different ways. But as a first approximation, nations
care about the welfare of their own citizens, and the welfare of citizens in other places are
not a primary consideration and may not matter greatly.93 A workable climate treaty will
have to be one that serves the interests of the United States and other major industrial
nations, including developing nations such as China and Brazil. We use the term
international Paretianism to refer to this pragmatic constraint on treaty-making: a treaty
is not possible unless it makes all its signatories better off.
It should be clear, from the foregoing discussion, that we reject international
Paretianism in principle. From a welfarist perspective, a step, such as genocide
prevention, might be justified even if its national benefits are exceeded by its national
costs, so long as the global benefits exceed the global costs. Nor do we insist that
international Paretianism is always a firm constraint on domestic judgments. It is
imaginable, for example, that domestic forces will favor at least some degree of altruism,
so that nations will take steps that promote global welfare without promoting domestic
welfare. The only point is that domestic self-interest imposes a significant limitation on
what is feasible, and that nations should not be expected to sign a climate change
agreement from which they are large-scale net losers. China is not likely to sign an
agreement that would cost it, on net, hundreds of billions of dollars each year; the same is
true of the United States. An important question, then, is whether a proposed allocation of
emissions rights will require one nation to give a great deal, in monetary terms, to others.
It is important to see that even if nations care only about their economic wellbeing, they might well be willing to join a suitably designed climate treaty. Scientific
and economic models indicate that, most likely, substantial cuts in greenhouse gas
emissions will produce global benefits in excess of global costs.94 For purposes of
producing agreement, a main problem is that climate change will affect different nations
differently, with some being harmed a great deal, and others being harmed relatively
little, at least over the next one hundred years.95 For example, the United States gains
less from a treaty than India and African nations, for example, simply because it has far
less to lose from climate change.96 It is obviously difficult to obtain agreement on
emissions reductions if some nations are likely to benefit far more than others from such
an agreement. If a specified level of reductions will give significant benefits to India and
Pakistan, but more modest benefits to the United States and Russia, the latter nations
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might well be reluctant to accept that level of reductions, and might demand some kind of
compensation.97
Even more troublesome, restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions will probably
be most costly for large emitting nations, including the United States.98 Indeed, the
United States would have borne at least half of the total world-wide cost of the Kyoto
Protocol, and perhaps significantly more than that – a point that helps explain its
unwillingness to ratify the treaty.99 Large emitters, facing significant costs from
emissions reductions requirements, therefore will be unlikely to join a treaty unless the
treaty uses their status quo emissions as the baseline from which to determine cuts. As a
practical matter, nations that are already the biggest greenhouse-gas emitters will not join
a treaty that requires them to reduce their emissions to the level of very poor nations; nor
would they enter a treaty that requires them to pay a lot of money for permits distributed
to the poor nations.100
The pragmatic virtue of the status quo approach is that it takes seriously these
political constraints on treaty-making. The corresponding problem with the per capita
approach is that it would require smaller industrial states to buy permits from larger
developing states, violating international Paretianism. There is little reason that the rich
states would be willing to agree to such an approach. The behavior of the United States,
with respect to the Kyoto Protocol, is revealing in this regard. The United States would
have had to spend over $300 billion to comply with its obligations; it is no accident that
no member of the United States Senate, Democratic or Republican, supported
ratification.101
To be sure, most wealthy nations send foreign aid to developing nations, and so it
would be a mistake to define their national interests in purely economic terms.102 We
have noted that nations are capable of being altruistic. A nation’s national interest might
be understood as some combination of altruistic and economic interests, a combination
already reflected in their foreign aid as well as economic policies. The nature of the
combination will vary with domestic political pressures. To the extent that powerful
domestic constituencies want to assist those in other nations, the altruistic elements will
be magnified. One might argue that, given the current level of altruism, nations would be
willing to adopt the per capita approach.
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The problem is that the existing level of foreign aid is probably not greatly lower
than the amount that rich states are willing to be pay in order to be altruistic. Such
nations are unlikely to agree to massive increases in the redistribution of wealth by
entering a climate treaty that requires them to bear most of the cost of greenhouse-gas
abatement. One risk is that if they agree to a treaty that redistributes wealth, rich states
will be tempted to cut back on foreign aid, so that the redistributive effect of the treaty
will be minimal or zero. Consider a few numbers in this regard. In 2006 the United States
gave almost $24 billion in foreign aid (a third of which was to Iraq).103 As noted, the
politically unacceptable Kyoto Protocol would have cost the United States over $300
billion over the indefinite future104—the equivalent of perhaps tens of billions of dollars
per year. The per capita approach (as compared to the status quo approach) would cost
the United States far more than that—as much as $100 billion per year for the indefinite
future.105 There is no sign that the United States would be willing to pay that amount,
well in excess of its existing foreign aid budget, as part of a climate change agreement.
In sum, the feasibility problem with the per capita approach is that it conflicts
with the state system that currently organizes the world. States might well be willing to
enter a climate treaty that mitigates climate change if the treaty creates restrictions that
work off existing levels of greenhouse-gas emissions. Doing so would serve their
national interests. But given the current level of altruism that appears to exist, they are
highly unlikely to adopt a redistributive approach like that mandated by the per capita
scheme. To insist on the per capita approach, then, is most likely to subvert the best
chance for a climate treaty and hence to render the climate change problem intractable – a
special problem for poor nations that are particularly vulnerable to that problem.106
B. Defective Government and Alternative Means to Redistribute
As is well known in the development literature, redistributing wealth to poor
nations is not easy or obvious.107 Large cash grants to governments are often siphoned
off by corrupt officials. Loans are similarly abused and often not repaid. Grants and
loans not lost to corruption are nonetheless often wasted because the donee government
lacks the expertise and institutional capacity to identify problems, monitor the
disbursement of funds, and use them widely.108 Donors have devised numerous means
for monitoring and controlling the use of funds but these often fail and frequently
generate resentment. In some cases, donors misunderstand the needs of the countries and
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squander funds on projects that do not help people who live in it; in other cases, donors
impose conditions that are politically controversial and even destabilizing.109 Donors
have also tried to circumvent corrupt or inept governments by directing aid to individuals
and NGOs rather than governments. But small donees are hard to monitor and control,
and have limited impact, and aid programs involving multiple recipients are hard to
coordinate.110
Painful trial and error have suggested some promising approaches, which
emphasize decentralization, sensitivity to context, and experimentation. Whatever the
merits and demerits of these approaches, at least they do not repeat the errors of past.
Now consider a climate treaty, which most likely would require the allocation of
valuable permits to the governments of poor states—the same corrupt or ineffective
governments that have misused foreign aid. It seems highly likely that some of these
governments will misuse these permits as well—transferring them to cronies, for
example.111
Even if the governments of developing countries are not corrupt, they will still not
necessarily use revenues from permits in the way that donor countries, motivated by
altruism, would want them to. Recall that the per capita approach was justified by
redistributive concerns: all else equal, a climate pact that favored developing nations is
desirable. If large countries tend to be poor, then the per capita approach has attractive
redistributive features. The redistributive approach is even better than the per capita
approach, on this view. But if the redistributive approach is not practicable, the per
capita approach might be second best.
Any realistic climate treaty will do no more than allocate permits to the
governments of developing nations. After these nations sell the permits, they will be free
to use the revenue however they want to. But the governments of developing nations are
not particularly generous to their poor. In a state like Guatemala, for example, taxes are
low, apparently because wealthy people disproportionately influence the political
process.112 It seems unlikely that the Guatemalan government, having received a
windfall of permits, will redistribute the revenues to the poor. More likely, it will simply
lower taxes on the wealthy even more. And if it does, then the per capita or redistributive
approach will not end up helping the very poor; it will end up helping wealthy people
who live in poor countries.
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Even worse, the development literature has identified the “resource curse”—the
fact that poor states that enjoy a windfall do worse than poor states that do not. 113
Theories abound for this phenomenon: one such theory is that a large pool of resources in
a state with poor institutions encourages insurgencies, since the insurgents can finance
the conflict by seizing control over the resources. The resource curse has been cited as a
possible explanation for foreign aid: a windfall of foreign aid is like the discovery of oil,
and may be similarly destabilizing.114 If this theory is right, distributing valuable permits
to poor countries may cause civil war rather than prosperity.
Whether these theories are sound or not, the point for present purposes is that it
would be hazardous to repeat the errors of development policy by using a climate treaty
as an opportunity to engage in foreign aid. The distribution of permits on a per capita
basis, by favoring poor states, would be just such an effort. If giving piles of cash to poor
states has failed to help them, then giving them piles of permits will also fail to help
them. To the extent that this is so, they should receive no more permits than are
necessary to cause them to internalize the external climate effects of polluting activity.

Conclusion
From the standpoint of both welfare and fairness, there are strong arguments for
large amounts of international redistribution. If resources from wealthy people in wealthy
nations could be transferred to poor people in poor nations, global welfare would be
significantly increased. At the same time, arguments from fairness suggest that people
should not have far worse prospects in life simply because of the nation in which they are
born. These arguments have led many analysts to suggest that the per capita approach is
the best way to allocate greenhouse gas emission rights. In the developing world, that
approach has widespread support, and there is no question that it will be pressed
aggressively in international negotiations.
We have urged that claims from both welfare and fairness fail to provide strong
support for the per capita approach. A central problem is that some wealthy nations have
large populations and some poor nations have small populations. Per capita allocations of
emissions rights would result in substantial benefits for China and India, both of which
are poor. But many nations are significantly poorer than those nations, and a directly
redistributive approach would be a far more effective way of assisting those who need
help. Moreover, any international agreement will benefit some nations more than others
and cost some nations more than others. In these circumstances, the per capita approach
gives the appearance, not the reality, of fairness.
It remains true that from the standpoint of welfare and fairness, per capita
allocations would be far better than the status quo approach. But here as elsewhere, the
best is the enemy of the good. A climate treaty that included the optimal level of
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emissions would be good. A climate treaty that included the optimal level of emissions
reductions and the optimal level of redistribution would be better still. But it is much less
likely to be possible. On welfarist grounds, and putting incentive effects to one side, the
redistributive approach is superior to the per capita approach, which is in turn superior to
the status quo approach. Unfortunately, the best approaches in principle are also least
likely to be feasible in practice. Insisting on the best approaches would likely defeat
current efforts, themselves admittedly fragile, to take significant steps to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, and in the process harm poor nations, which are most
vulnerable to the climate change problem.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Professor Eric A. Posner
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
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